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Abstract 
 
We investigate the ethical behaviour of small business owners by focusing on individuals’ 
motivations to comply with tax obligations. In a study of 330 small business owners, we 
assess the role of internalised motivation to pay taxes versus extrinsic motivation in driving 
tax compliance. First, we find that internalised and extrinsic motivation have distinct 
predictors. Internalised motivation is related to strong personal moral norms to comply and a 
sense that the fiscal system is fair. Extrinsic motivation is related to perceptions that penalties 
are severe, that checks are likely, and is associated with a perceived lack of tax knowledge. 
Second, we find that, when considered together, internalised motivation but not extrinsic 
motivation predicts self-reported tax compliance. Third, we test the undermining hypothesis 
by which the presence of extrinsic motivation may crowd out the positive effect of 
internalised motivation. We find evidence of a motivation crowding effect only at very high 
levels of extrinsic motivation. We discuss avenues for further integration of motivation 
theory in research on tax compliance behaviour, and more generally the study of regulatory 
compliance and ethical behaviour in business settings. 
 
Keywords: internalised motivation, intrinsic motivation, extrinsic motivation, motivation 
crowding, tax compliance, tax evasion 
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Introduction 
 
“If people be led by laws, and uniformity sought to be given them by punishments, 
they will try to avoid the punishment, but have no sense of shame. If they be led by 
virtue, [...] they will have the sense of shame, and moreover will become good.” 
(Confucius, as cited in Legge, 2001, p. 146) 
 
Accumulated knowledge on human behaviour from social and behavioural sciences 
echoes the thoughts of many great thinkers in that punishments are solutions of last resort for 
driving human behaviour. Social norms, personal values, enjoyment of an activity, the desire 
to pay back generosity or to follow an inspirational figure, are all motives that are generally 
more effective and have a longer-lasting effect. However, although punishments may not be 
ideal, they are often ‘better than nothing’ when other internalised factors do not exist. The 
current study looks at the dynamics of internalised motivation versus external punishment in 
driving the motivation of business owners to comply with tax obligations.  
Intrinsic, internalised, and extrinsic motivation 
 In the early 1970s, Edward Deci asked students to participate in an experiment where 
they had the opportunity to resolve a three-dimensional puzzle; essentially, the opportunity to 
play an interesting game. His experiment revealed a puzzling result – students who received 
financial rewards for playing the game during the experiment engaged less with the puzzle in 
the period following the experiment than those who did not (Deci, 1971). This experiment 
cemented the foundation of an academic debate on the use of external reinforcements to 
motivate behaviour, an ongoing debate that now spans multiple disciplines, from psychology 
and education to economics and organisational behaviour. At the core of the debate is the 
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contention that the introduction of external rewards or punishments undermines people’s 
existing motivation to perform a behaviour, so that it leads to the unintended consequence 
that people perform a desirable behaviour even less than when these incentives are 
introduced. This effect has been dubbed the ‘crowding out’ of motivation (Frey & Jegen, 
2001). We will return to this debate in the current section, but first we focus on defining and 
distinguishing intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. 
 Definitional issues. We begin by clarifying the distinction of two motivation types at 
the root of the debate: the dichotomy of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. In much of 
psychological and educational research, intrinsic motivation is defined as motivation intrinsic 
to a certain task – people can perform an activity for the pure joy of doing so; this joy derives 
from satisfied curiosity, joy of playing, the satisfaction of mastery, etc. (Reiss, 2004). Any 
motivation not intrinsic to performing the task itself is then considered extrinsic. This can 
range from internalised forms of extrinsic motivation (for example, a student may study for 
an exam because a high mark would contribute to an increased feeling of self-worth or would 
further his goals to follow an academic career path) to external forms (for example, a child 
might eat her healthy greens because she is ‘bribed’ with desert or punished with reduced 
computer game time). As Deci and Ryan (2000a) note, intrinsic motivation is rare in the 
every-day life of older children and adults, as most of the tasks populating our daily routine 
do not provide intrinsic joy (e.g., proofreading of papers, answering work emails, organising 
research data collection, food shopping, servicing the car, and the list goes on). To take 
another example, in this paper we will look at motivations relating to tax compliance; it is 
difficult to imagine the preparation of a tax return to be an intrinsically joyful task. However, 
of the possible motivations for performing tasks that are not intrinsically motivating, some 
are more internalised than others. Internalised motivation usually means that a person 
performs a task without the need for external prompts, for instance because the task is 
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important to achieving their personal goals, in order to avoid feeling embarrassed, or to 
reciprocate someone else’s kindness. In common parlance as well as mainstream economic 
research (and by contrast to psychological research as discussed above), ‘intrinsic motivation’ 
denotes all such types of internalised motivation or self-motivation, whether they are intrinsic 
to the task or not. By contrast, ‘extrinsic motivation’ is that which is not internalised, most 
typically monetary rewards or punishments for performing a task (e.g., Bénabou & Tirole, 
2003; Frey & Jegen, 2001). In this paper, we focus on the distinction between internalised 
motivation and extrinsic (i.e., non-internalised) motivation.  
Internalised versus extrinsic motivation. Imagine the owner of a small independent 
café baking cakes for the day at 5.30am. Now imagine different scenarios about what drives 
him to wake up before sunrise to bake: (a) baking for the sake of baking; (b) the desire to run 
a respected business buzzing with happy customers; (c) the knowledge that customers rely on 
him to get their breakfast on time on way to work; (d) his mother’s reminders to get the 
baking done on time. Which scenarios do you think are likely to produce the tastiest cakes? 
Based on existing results, one would predict that the more internalised forms of motivation 
are likely to lead to better performance and longer lasting effects. Motivation sources can be 
attributed by the individual either internally or externally, and internal attributions are related 
to a greater sense of autonomy which is in turn associated with increased motivation and 
performance (Ryan & Deci, 2000b). External sources of motivation sometimes undergo a 
process of internalisation and integration with individual goals leading to self-motivation 
(Deci & Ryan, 1985). Research in a variety of domains has shown that higher internalisation 
is associated with higher performance, whether this is school performance (Miserandino, 
1996), pro-environmental behaviour (Osbaldiston & Sheldon, 2003), abstaining from alcohol 
abuse (Ryan, Plant, & O’Malley, 1995), or work performance (Gagné & Deci, 2005).  
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Given that internalised motivation seems desirable in a wide range of domains, it is of 
interest to determine the conditions that facilitate the emergence and maintenance of 
internalised motivation. Internalised motivation is associated with a sense of competence and 
autonomy (Ryan & Deci, 2000b). Conversely, factors that are seen to undermine competence 
and autonomy are associated with extrinsic motivation. For example, the nudges of the 
baker’s mother could be perceived as interference that undermines autonomy, thus leading to 
extrinsic motivation. Baking for the sake of baking may only be intrinsically motivating as 
long as the results are tasty; conversely, lack of baking competence will soon erode 
internalised motivation. Another important facilitating condition of internalised motivation is 
social relatedness (Ryan & Deci, 2000b), the extent to which the individual is embedded in a 
secure and supportive social network. In the baker example, the customers who rely on the 
baker to provide their breakfast muffins may be loyal customers who are always friendly and 
appreciative of the bakery. Or instead they may seem demanding and aloof customers who 
write unflattering reviews of the café. In the first instance, the baker’s motivation will be 
related to reciprocating the customers’ loyalty (see also Frey & Jegen, 2001), while in the 
second internalised motivation is likely to be undermined.  
While internalised motivation is desirable for its effectiveness and sustainability, it is 
nonetheless true that in some instances where internalised motivation is lacking then extrinsic 
rewards or punishments may be the only way to affect behaviour. Imagine that the town 
where the baker above operates decides to support the baking industry, and therefore the local 
authority will reduce tax rates for bakeries but also introduce controls relating to the quality 
of ingredients. While our baker may be internally motivated to produce the best products 
possible, others may not be as internally motivated and will require slight nudges. Given that 
our baker is already highly motivated, the local authority figures that such measures can’t 
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hurt people like him but will nudge others in the right direction. However, they may be wrong 
in this assumption due to motivation crowding effects.  
Motivation crowding. As illustrated by Deci’s (1971) experiment discussed in the 
opening of the paper, the introduction of external incentives may undermine intrinsic 
motivation. The last four decades have provided increasing evidence to show that external 
incentives often undermine people’s internal motivation to perform certain actions, especially 
when rewards are directly linked to engagement or performance (for a review see Deci, 
Koestner, & Ryan, 1999). Despite mounting evidence, the crowding out of intrinsic 
motivation is still subject to ongoing debate (for a review see Cerasoli, Nicklin, & Ford, 
2014). 
In the current study, we are interested in the behaviour of small business owners. 
Debates relating to motivation types and motivation crowding are also reflected in the 
organisational and business literature (Kunz & Pfaff, 2002; Osterloh & Frey, 2000), although 
the systematic study of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation effects is relatively recent in this 
field (Gagné & Deci, 2005). There is evidence that internalised motivation is associated with 
better work performance (Gagné, Koestner, & Zuckerman, 2000) but also that external 
incentives can undermine this internalised motivation (Deckop & Cirka, 2000; Dysvik & 
Kuvaas, 2013; Eden, 1975). More relevant to the topic of tax compliance, ethical behaviour 
in organisational settings has been shown to be undermined by external punishments when 
internalised motivation is present (Houser, Xiao, McCabe, & Smith, 2008; Schulze & Frank, 
2003), contributing to the lack of effectiveness in the introduction of formal systems that 
promote ethical decisions (Jacobsen, Hvitved, & Andersen, 2014; Smith-Crowe et al., 2014).   
Motivation and tax compliance 
The current study looks at one particular instance of organisational behaviour – small 
business owners’ compliance with fiscal regulations; in particular, we focus on small 
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business owners in the UK. Tax compliance is an interesting case of regulatory compliance. 
Some view taxes as an imposition by the state, even to the extreme opinion held by some 
business owners that ‘taxes are theft’ (Braithwaite, 2009). Some view taxes as an exchange – 
taxes they pay provide access to services such as infrastructure, social security, etc. (Frey & 
Torgler, 2007). Others still view paying taxes as a moral obligation, whereby the public 
system can provide for those most vulnerable in society (Torgler, 2005). This diversity of 
attitudes is further enhanced by the fact that different types of taxes have different 
representations (e.g., social security contributions versus sales taxes) (e.g., see Adams & 
Webley, 2001). The literature looking at tax compliance has generally emphasised that tax 
compliance is complex and subject to a wide range of determinants (for reviews, see 
Andreoni, Erard, & Feinstein, 1998; Hashimzade, Myles, & Tran-Nam, 2013; Kamleitner, 
Korunka, & Kirchler, 2012; Kirchler, 2007; Pickhardt & Prinz, 2013). Given the large 
variance in motivations to pay taxes, tax compliance behaviour is an interesting case for 
looking at motivation types and their interaction.  
Indeed, debates in the tax compliance literature seem to be focused on the battle of 
internalised and extrinsic motivation, without necessarily acknowledging it as such. 
Overviews of research on tax compliance broadly differentiate two camps: (a) the deterrence 
camp, and (b) the social factors camp (e.g., Kirchler, 2007; Pickhardt & Prinz, 2013; Torgler, 
2002). The first strand of research originates in the ‘classic model’ of tax compliance 
(Allingham & Sandmo, 1972; Yitzhaki, 1974) which construes taxpayers as rational actors 
aiming to maximise profit. When making tax compliance decisions, taxpayers will take into 
account the loss incurred if caught evading (the penalty for evasion) and the likelihood of 
incurring this loss (the probability of being audited by the authorities). Empirical evidence 
does indeed suggest that publishing higher penalties or increasing the perception that audits 
are frequent can increase compliance (Slemrod, Blumenthal, & Christian, 2001). However, 
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although deterrence explains some variance in increased compliance, many have argued that 
it does not explain the widespread compliance observed in society (for a review see Andreoni 
et al., 1998) or the fact that some people would always comply even if deterrents were absent 
(Wenzel, 2004b). A second strand of research has thus focused on highlighting the other, 
more internalised forms of motivation to comply. For instance, Torgler (2002) argues that 
‘tax morale’ (defined as intrinsic motivation to pay taxes, or perceived moral obligation, see 
Torgler, 2005) contributes to tax compliance by encouraging individuals to uphold their own 
personal standards of behaviour. As suggested by motivation research discussed earlier (Ryan 
& Deci, 2000b), internalised motivation is facilitated by a sense that the action is consistent 
with the individuals’ values and principles, thus relating to a sense of autonomy. Also, in 
relation to internalised motivation to comply with tax obligations, Feld and Frey (2002) place 
emphasis on the role of fairness in tax compliance, pointing out that taxpayers who perceive 
taxpaying as a fair process (in terms of how they are treated and benefits they receive for 
taxes paid) are more likely to be intrinsically motivated to reciprocate by being cooperative. 
Wenzel (2004a) stresses the importance of social norms for tax compliance through people’s 
motivation to follow taxpaying norms in their existing groups. Both the results above on the 
effect of fairness and social norms speaks to relatedness, another facilitator of internalised 
motivation; an action that represents meaningful interaction with others is more likely to be 
internally-motivating (Ryan & Deci, 2000b). Such meaningful social interaction can be 
represented by the need to act in a way that is consistent with norms held by significant 
others (Wenzel, 2004a) and to enjoy equitable exchanges (Feld & Frey, 2007). 
The two ‘camps’ of tax compliance research, focused on deterrence versus social 
factors, map onto the concepts of internalised and extrinsic motivation, although this 
connection has not been explored in detail. It is only recently that internalised and extrinsic 
motivation have been contrasted and compared in relation to tax compliance (although not in 
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direct relation to the intrinsic/extrinsic motivation debate). Valerie Bratithwaite’s work 
proposed that citizens may take different stances towards authorities (which she titles 
‘motivational postures’). Of the two stances that lead to compliance with authorities, she 
contrasts commitment and capitulation; the former represents cooperation with authorities 
because it is perceived as the right thing to do, while the later represents compliance due to 
the enforcement power of authorities (Braithwaite, 2009). In parallel, Kirchler, Hoelzl, and 
Wahl (2008) developed a model of tax compliance that integrates social factors and 
deterrence as two separate routes to compliance. The model differentiates voluntary and 
enforced compliance – concepts akin to internalised and extrinsic motivation (see also 
committed versus enforced motivation in Gangl, Hofmann, Groot, et al., 2015). While the 
original model proposed that both enforced and voluntary compliance will lead to compliant 
behaviour via two different routes, more recent data suggests that only voluntary compliance 
is related to compliance intentions (Gangl, Hofmann, Groot, et al., 2015). Further empirical 
research is needed to differentiate the role of internalised and extrinsic motivation in tax 
compliance; in addition, no studies seem to directly address the motivation undermining 
hypothesis by which external punishments or rewards may undermine internalised motivation 
(although see Gangl, Hofmann, & Kirchler, 2015 who report a negative association between 
enforcement and trust in authorities). This study aims to contribute empirical data that 
addresses this knowledge gap. 
The current study     
 We aim to tease out the role of internalised and extrinsic motivation in tax compliance 
in several ways. First, we ask what are the factors associated with each type of motivation. If 
we attempt to increase either type of motivation – which levers are available in order to do 
so? Based on the literature reviewed above, we propose the following: 
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Proposition 1. Internalised motivation for tax compliance will be jointly predicted by 
personal standards of behaviour (personal norms), social norms, and fairness. 
Proposition 2. Extrinsic motivation will be jointly predicted by heightened 
perceptions of external punishment (large penalties and frequent audits) and lack of 
competence.  
Second, we look at which type of motivation leads to the desired behaviour. We will 
look at differential effects of internalised and extrinsic motivation on compliance outcomes. 
Consistent with previous studies, we will employ a self-reported compliance measure, asking 
people to state to what extent they declare all their income and do not overstate deductions on 
their tax return. We expect based on previous works that internalised motivation will be 
related to desired outcomes, while extrinsic motivation will be weakly or even not at all 
related to compliance.  
Proposition 3. Internalised motivation to pay taxes will be strongly related to self-
reported compliance behaviour. By comparison, externalised motivation will have a 
weaker link to self-reported compliance.  
The current study goes beyond studying the differential effects of internalised and 
extrinsic motivation independently. We also look at the interaction effect – consistent with 
the motivation literature we expect to find that the presence of extrinsic motivation may 
undermine the beneficial effects of internalised motivation. When extrinsic motivation is low, 
we expect to find that internalised motivation predicts self-reported compliance. However, 
when extrinsic motivation is high, there will be no effect of internalised motivation on 
compliance. 
Proposition 4. High extrinsic motivation will moderate the link between internalised 
motivation and self-reported compliance.  
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Our focus population is owners of micro-business, defined as a business (incorporated 
or not incorporated) with under 10 employees and a turnover under £ 1.6 million 
(‘Commission Recommendation 2003/361/EC’, 2003). We chose to look at self-employed 
individuals and owners of very small business given that compliance attitudes and the factors 
influencing these attitudes are most likely to be relevant at individual level as opposed to 
larger businesses where compliance decisions are distributed among several individuals.  
 
Method 
Sample 
330 owners or part-owners of micro-business in the UK took part in the study in two 
data collection sessions in February and June 20151. 76.1% of respondents were male. For 
other demographic characteristics (age, income, education, geography, and business 
structure) please refer to Table 1.  
[Insert Table 1 here] 
Procedure 
All the measures were pilot-tested for comprehension on an initial sample of 30 small 
business owners in the UK. Following feedback from pilot testing, the measures were 
adjusted (Collins, 2003). The main study was carried out online and invitations to take part in 
the study were sent via email to a random sample of micro-businesses. A list of business 
email addresses was obtained by the researchers from a UK database recommended for use in 
tax research with small businesses (Barham & Fox, 2011). The sample included businesses 
with under 10 employees, turnover under £1.6 million (see definition of micro-business 
above), and included both self-employed individuals (sole traders) and limited companies. 
                                                          
1 Some data resulting from this survey are also analysed in [names removed to maintain anonymity]. Manuscript 
in preparation. 
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The database provider extracted a random sample (simple randomisation) from the total 
number of micro-businesses in the UK.  
With the assistance of a market research company, email invitations to take part in the 
study were sent on behalf of the researchers in two waves, in February and June 2015. The 
total number of emails sent out was 21.000, making the number of questionnaire respondents 
1.57% of all the emails sent out. It is worth noting that a significant number of email 
invitations were undeliverable to the email addresses listed, so the response rate based on 
delivered email will be higher. Given the fully anonymous nature of the survey, it was not 
possible to attempt to increase the response rate with follow-up emails. Such low response 
rates are not unusual for one-shot electronic surveys; however, given the potential response 
bias we only interpret relations between variables; the interpretation of absolute levels of 
variables may not be meaningful for the population of micro-business owners in the UK. 
Given the legal and moral implications of the tax questions, we were particularly concerned 
with designing the research in a way that would minimise social-desirability and non-
responses biases. Our approach was to collect responses using a fully anonymous online 
survey. Participants were assured that they cannot be identified based on their responses and 
were encouraged to be honest and open. 
Participants were first given a brief overview of the survey topic and they were 
informed of their rights to voluntary participation and confidentiality. They proceeded to 
complete the measures. All measures employed 7-point Likert-type scales. After completing 
the survey, participants who chose to leave their contact details (which would be collected 
completely separate from their survey responses to guarantee anonymity) were rewarded with 
a £5 cheque for participation and the opportunity to win shopping vouchers up to £100.  
Measures 
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Internalised and extrinsic motivation. The two motivation types were assessed using the 
existing 5-item scales to measure voluntary compliance (i.e., internalised motivation) and 
enforced compliance (i.e., extrinsic motivation) designed and validated with Austrian 
taxpayers (see Kirchler & Wahl, 2010). The scales were adapted slightly following initial 
qualitative testing with UK taxpayers, and can be found in the Appendix. Participants were 
asked to rate their agreement to these statements on a 7-point scale from (1 = disagree 
completely to 7 = agree completely). In first instance, we performed an exploratory factor 
analysis (principal components analysis, Direct Oblimin rotation), to check that the ten items 
load on the two distinct factors of internalised and extrinsic motivation. We chose to begin 
using PCA in order to match the analysis strategy to the original TAX-I and check that the 
factor structure is unchanged following translation. Factor analysis confirmed that the ten 
items load on the two distinct factors of internalised and extrinsic motivation. Both scales had 
good reliability in the current study: internalised motivation scale α = .883 and extrinsic 
motivation scale α = .879. 
Given that our scales were based on a priori assumed theoretical constructs, we performed 
confirmatory factor analysis using the AMOS package, in a model that included the 
internalised and extrinsic motivation factors, as well as the four-item fairness scale described 
below. We found the model χ2 to be significant (p < .001); however, this significance is not a 
reliable indicator of model fit for models with large numbers of observations such as the 
present one (Byrne, 2016). We found the model to be moderate-to-good fit, with CMIN/DF = 
2.462, values for goodness-of-fit indices over .90 (GFI = .934, AGFI = .901), comparative 
indices of fit approaching or over .95 (CFI = .965, NFI = .943), and root mean square error of 
approximation under .008 indicating moderate fit (RMSEA = .067) (interpretation of indices 
based on Byrne, 2016).      
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Self-reported compliance. Tax compliance was measured by asking participants to what 
extent they agree (on a 7-point scale) with the following statements: ‘I declare all of my 
income on my tax return, including all cash earnings’ and ‘I never over-claim expenses on 
my tax return’ ( r(330) = .549, p < .001 ).  
Personal moral norms and social moral norms. Personal and social norms were assessed 
by adapting items used in Wenzel (2004a) following initial testing. Personal moral norms 
were assessed by asking participant agreement with the following statements: ‘I believe I 
should declare all of my income on my tax return’ and ‘I believe I shouldn’t over-claim 
expenses on my tax return’, r (330) = .684, p < .001. Social moral norms were assessed with 
the following statements: ‘In my opinion, most taxpayers in the UK believe they should 
declare all of their income on their tax return, including all cash earnings’ and ‘In my 
opinion, most taxpayers in the UK believe they shouldn’t over-claim expenses on their tax 
return’, r (330) = .705, p < .001. Factors analysis confirmed that the four items load on the 
two distinct factors of personal and social norms (principal components analysis, Direct 
Oblimin rotation). This four-item model was further included in a confirmatory factor 
analysis as discussed above.    
Fairness. Fairness was assessed by assessing both procedural and distributive justice 
adapting previous measures (Barham & Fox, 2011; Hartner, Rechberger, Kirchler, & 
Schabmann, 2008). Two items each were used to assess procedural justice (‘HM Revenue and 
Customs treats me fairly in my dealings with them’ and ‘HM Revenue and Customs treats me 
respectfully in my dealings with them’) and distributive justice (‘The level of tax I pay is 
generally fair’ and ‘I receive adequate public services for the taxes I pay’). Given that both 
procedural and distributive justice loaded on the same factor (principal components analysis, 
Direct Oblimin rotation) we computed the four items to assess fairness (α = .809).  
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Deterrence factors – perceptions of penalties and audits. Perceptions of the seriousness of 
the penalty for one’s own business were assessed by participant agreement with the following 
statement: ‘If I evaded taxes and got caught, the penalties would be crippling for my 
business’. Perceptions of the likelihood of audits were assessed with the following statement: 
‘If I regularly did not declare income for tax purposes, I would certainly get caught’ (adapted 
from Barham & Fox, 2011) Although our initial intention was to compute the two measures 
in a ‘deterrence’ factor, the two items were not highly enough correlated to suggest they 
assess a similar construct (r (330) = .292, p < .001) and therefore we will differentially assess 
the role of perceptions of penalties and perceptions of audits.  
Tax knowledge. Confidence in one’s tax knowledge was assessed using the following single 
statement: ‘I feel confident and knowledgeable in dealing with taxes’. 
Demographic variables. Given that demographic variables can explain some variance in tax 
compliance we also assessed gender, age and education (the latter two by using centile 
distributions from the UK’s Office for National Statistics, 2014). These variables will be used 
as co-variates in the analysis.  
Please refer to Table 2 for descriptive data on the study variables and correlations 
among study variables.  
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
Results 
Determinants of internalised and extrinsic motivation  
To determine the factors related to each type of motivation, we included all the 
variables measured as predictors (personal norms, social norms, fairness, penalty perception, 
audit perception, and knowledge) in a linear regression analysis to predict the motivation 
outcome. In the first step we entered the demographic variables used as co-variates. In the 
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second step we entered our predictor variables as described above. Two separate linear 
regression analyses were conducted, one for internalised motivation as outcome, and the 
second for extrinsic motivation as outcome.  
Internalised motivation. The results of the regression analysis are presented in Table 3. As 
expected (see Proposition 1), internalised motivation is predicted by strong personal norms 
and high fairness perceptions. We also predicted that internalised motivation would be related 
to the perceived strength of social norms against evasion. While social norms did not emerge 
as a significant predictor, this may be because social norms have been shown to affect tax 
compliance when they are internalised as personal norms (Wenzel, 2004b), an explanation 
also consistent with the nature of internalised motivation. Therefore, we carried out further 
analyses to test whether the inclusion of personal norms explains the variance due to social 
norms. We tested this indirect effect using bootstrapping (PROCESS, Model 4, Hayes, 2013). 
Indeed, when personal norms are not included, there is a significant effect of social norms on 
internalised motivation which is rendered non-significant by the inclusion of personal norms 
pointing to the indirect effect of personal norms (LLCI = .0688, ULCI = .1746).  
[Insert Table 3 here] 
Extrinsic motivation. The results of the regression analysis on extrinsic motivation are 
presented in Table 4. As expected (see Proposition 2), extrinsic motivation is related to 
deterrence factors, being higher when audits are perceived to be likely and penalties are 
perceive to be severe. High ratings of extrinsic motivation are also associated with low 
societal norms against evasion and low confidence in one’s tax knowledge.  
[Insert Table 4 here] 
Effects of internalised and extrinsic motivation on tax compliance  
Direct effects. To test the effect of internalised and extrinsic motivation of compliance we 
included the two motivation types in a regression model (after the inclusion of demographic 
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variables as described above). We find that internalised motivation predicts self-reported 
compliance, while there is no effect of extrinsic motivation, as illustrated in Table 5 (see 
Model 2). This result is consistent with our initial assumptions (Proposition 3).   
[Insert Table 5 here] 
Interaction effects. To test the interaction effect of the two variables, we computed the 
product of the two standardised variables of internalised and extrinsic motivation. The 
analysis revealed a significant interaction of the two motivation types (see Table 5, Model 3). 
To further explore the direction of this interaction we used bootstrapping to test the 
moderating effect of extrinsic motivation on the relationship between internalised motivation 
and self-reported compliance (using PROCESS, Model 1, Hayes, 2013). We found that this 
relationship becomes weaker for greater levels of the moderator, to become non-significant 
for very high levels (see Table 6). The simple slopes analysis is illustrated in Figure 1 – the 
figure captures the way that the relationship between internalised motivation and self-
reported compliance becomes weaker with increasing levels of extrinsic motivation to 
become non-significant for the 90th centile value (Aiken & West, 1991; Preacher, 2016). This 
result is in line with our initial expectation (Proposition 4). However, the ‘crowding out’ 
effect expected is only present at very high levels of extrinsic motivation.    
[Insert Table 6 here] 
[Insert Image 1 here] 
  
Discussion 
The current study looked at the determinants and effects of internalised and extrinsic 
motivation for business owners’ compliance with tax regulations. Tax compliance is far more 
than a strictly financial behaviour – while economic factors may play a role, so do wider 
perceptions of social norms, personal values, or the perception that the state provides 
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adequate services for taxes paid (for a comprehensive review, see Kirchler, 2007). These 
varied determinants, from internalised values to external punishment make tax compliance 
behaviour particularly interesting for studying the dynamics of extrinsic motivation, 
internalised motivation, and behaviour.     
High levels of internalised motivation were associated with strong personal moral 
norms of compliance, which represent internalised social norms. This result is consistent with 
the motivation literature where internalised motivation results from the internalisation of 
social values and external goals (Ryan & Deci, 2000b), as well as the tax compliance 
literature and the positive effect of personal norms (Wenzel, 2004b) and tax morale (Torgler, 
2002) on compliance. High levels of internalised motivation were also associated with 
perceptions of fairness in terms of the distribution of taxes and procedures of tax collection. 
This effect is also consistent with the role of reciprocity in social interactions in internalised 
motivation (Frey & Jegen, 2001) and more specifically in tax compliance (Feld & Frey, 2002; 
Frey & Torgler, 2007).  
High levels of extrinsic motivation were, as expected, associated with beliefs that 
penalties are high and audits are likely, consistent with the definition of extrinsic motivation 
as effected by factors seen as an external imposition (Ryan & Deci, 2000a). Furthermore, 
extrinsic motivation was also associated with lack of confidence in one’s knowledge of tax 
regulations and weak social norms, consistent with the effect of lack of competence and 
autonomy, as well as lack of relatedness in extrinsic motivation (Ryan & Deci, 2000b).  
 We also found that when the effects of internalised and extrinsic motivation on 
compliance are considered together, then internalised motivation but not extrinsic motivation 
is associated with higher self-reported compliance. These results reflect debates in the 
motivation literature and the accumulated evidence suggesting that internalised motivation is 
more effective at directing behaviour than extrinsic motivation (Deci et al., 1999). These 
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results also reflect those of a recent study on Dutch and Austrian self-employed professionals, 
where commitment to honour fiscal obligations, but not motivation to comply due to 
deterrence, was positively associated with tax compliance (Gangl, Hofmann, Groot, et al., 
2015).   
Furthermore, we tested the interaction effect of internalised and extrinsic motivation 
and the hypothesis that the presence of extrinsic motivation may crowd out the beneficial 
effect of internalised motivation. We indeed found that there is a significant interaction effect 
– internalised motivation is more weakly related to behaviour at high levels of extrinsic 
motivation; the significant effect of internalised motivation even disappears at very high 
levels of extrinsic motivation. These results show some support for motivation crowding in 
tax compliance, consistent with the wider motivation literature (Bénabou & Tirole, 2003; 
Frey & Jegen, 2001). However, it must be highlighted that the crowding out effect of 
extrinsic motivation only occurs for very high levels of extrinsic motivation. The mere 
presence of extrinsic motivation is not damaging to the effects of internalised motivation, 
only very high levels of extrinsic motivation (see Cerasoli et al., 2014 for a similar finding).  
As outlined above, the results are broadly consistent with the wider motivation 
literature, as well as past research in the tax compliance of small business owners. The 
current study makes several contributions to integrate and advance current knowledge. As 
discussed in the introduction to the paper, debates surrounding tax compliance behaviour 
have highlighted either the role of deterrence or that of internalised social factors (such as tax 
morale or reciprocity) in guiding behaviour. In effect, this distinction is broadly about the 
differential effects of internalised and extrinsic motivation. Although the concepts of 
internalised and extrinsic motivation have been connected to tax compliance in past research 
(e.g., Torgler, 2005), research on motivation is peripheral to tax compliance (as opposed to 
being central in other fields, such as education or organisational studies).  
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The first contribution of the paper is to bring the motivation debate to the centre of 
understanding tax compliance and argues that tax compliance research would benefit from 
integrating insights from research on internalised and extrinsic motivation in other domains 
(for reviews, see for example Cerasoli et al., 2014; Lepper & Henderlong, 2000; Ryan & 
Deci, 2000b). While two general strands of research can be differentiated in tax compliance 
research as highlighted above, there have been recent attempts to integrate these different 
strands. For example, Kirchler, Hoelzl, and Wahl (2008) propose that compliance can be 
achieved through different routes – a power-based effect based on deterrents (akin to 
extrinsic motivation) and a trust-based effect based on fairness (akin to internalised 
motivation) (for a similar distinction see commitment versus capitulation in Braithwaite, 
2009). Such models allowed the comparison of the effect of internalised and extrinsic 
motivation and generally suggest that internalised motivation has longer-term effects 
beneficial effects on compliance while extrinsic motivation is less sustainable therefore most 
costly to maintain (Gangl, Hofmann, Groot, et al., 2015; Gangl, Hofmann, & Kirchler, 2015). 
Our results support past research that shows internalised motivation to be superior to extrinsic 
motivation. However, it goes beyond testing their differential effects and looks at their 
interaction in order to test motivation crowding effects.  
The second main contribution of this paper is to highlight the interaction effect of 
internalised and extrinsic motivation and to suggest that extrinsic motivation may crowd out 
internalised motivation. In the current study, this effect seems to only occur for very high 
levels of extrinsic motivation. The results are not only relevant for the particular case of tax 
compliance, but contribute more generally to the motivation debate. Consistent with past 
results, we find that internalised motivation has a stronger relationship with the target 
behaviour than extrinsic motivation (for a review, see Cerasoli et al., 2014). Contrary to 
previous research on deterrence in business settings, we find that the significant relationship 
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between internalised motivation and behaviour is not affected by moderate levels of extrinsic 
motivation, but only very high levels. This result is interesting because it contrasts previous 
results from experimental settings (Houser et al., 2008; Schulze & Frank, 2003) – it may be 
that enforcement levels observed in the field are not sufficient to provide the undermining 
effect of extrinsic motivation observed in a controlled laboratory setting. This point to a 
potential ‘threshold’ effect by which some degree of external deterrent may not be perceived 
as undermining. The mere presence of external motivators does not necessarily ‘crowd out’ 
internalised motivation unless they are salient enough to threaten individual autonomy 
(Gagné & Deci, 2005). Future research on regulatory compliance may look at measuring 
autonomy (i.e., feeling of being controlled/coerced to comply) in order to tease out the 
relationship between motivation and behaviour. 
Tax compliance is a complex behaviour affected by a wide variety of internalised and 
external factors and the third contribution of the current paper is to bring tax compliance in 
the focus of motivation researchers. Tax behaviour is driven by many different factors, from 
the more internalised (values) to the external (financial penalty), making it ripe for research 
on the various types of internalised motivation (Ryan & Deci, 2000a). Such regulatory 
compliance settings also provide interesting cases for studying motivation, not least because 
the external motivators tend to be negative (penalties) rather than positive (rewards). While 
there is a wealth of results on the ‘crowding out’ effects of external rewards, the effects for 
penalties are far less clear (for a review, see Cerasoli et al., 2014).         
Although our study proposes novel results for the role of motivation in tax 
compliance, further research is needed to increase confidence in these results. Our study uses 
a questionnaire method to collect self-reported tax compliance behaviour. Given that tax 
evasion is a sensitive topic we are aware that a direct measure of compliance may have 
limitations in capturing the extent of non-compliant behaviour. Tax attitudes and intentions 
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may not always relate to individuals’ behaviour (Hessing, Elffers, & Weigel, 1988). Although 
caution is needed in extrapolating survey results to behaviour (for a discussion see Onu, 
2016), self-reports of tax compliance have been shown to be useful proxies for actual 
behaviour (Elffers, Robben, & Hessing, 1992) and such measures are commonly used in the 
tax compliance literature (e.g., Braithwaite, 2009; Webley, Cole, & Eidjar, 2001). We have 
attempted to mitigate social desirability biases by ensuring the questionnaire is administered 
in an impersonal way online and by assuring participants of complete anonymity. A further 
limitation is that data are correlational. We test our assumptions based on a motivation model 
in which certain factors (e.g. penalties, norms) affect motivation, which in turn affects 
behaviour. It is conceivable that responses to motivation questions are rationalisations for 
existing behaviours and therefore experimental evidence would be desirable to corroborate 
the current results (although see Wenzel, 2005 who discards the rationalisation hypothesis in 
a similar context).  
The current results are in line with a number of other authors who have argued that 
tax authorities should ideally encourage internalised motivation through fostering positive 
norms and a sense of fairness (e.g., Alm et al., 2012; Braithwaite, 2009; Gangl, Hofmann, & 
Kirchler, 2015). However, the current results do not necessarily support the view that any 
amount of enforcement is damaging to internalised motivation (Gangl, Hofmann, Groot, et 
al., 2015), only particularly high levels, consistent with a current review of the motivation 
literature (Cerasoli et al., 2014). Rather than subscribing to a view that any enforcement 
policy is unhelpful, we acknowledge that enforcement is useful but would argue that initial 
enforcement would have to be supported with measures that lead to a more internalised 
motivation in order to achieve sustainable positive effects. It may also be useful for 
authorities to assess population levels of internalised and extrinsic motivation before 
attempting to use behavioural campaigns to change behaviour (for a similar suggestion in the 
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environmental policy domain see Osbaldiston & Sheldon, 2003). This is particularly 
important given that there is wide cross-country variability in tax compliance and its 
determinants (e.g., Torgler & Schneider, 2002), therefore the present UK-specific results may 
not be immediately applicable to other contexts. Further research is needed to clarify the 
dynamics of internalised and extrinsic motivation in tax compliance and in particular the 
presence of motivation crowding. We hope that the present study encourages tax researchers 
to benefit from accumulated knowledge on extrinsic and internalised motivation; we also 
hope that motivation researchers will consider tax compliance as a worthwhile behaviour to 
study.  
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Table 1 
Sample characteristics 
Age (years) Personal income (£) Education Business type Geography 
25-34 6.7% 0-10,000 13.0% GCSE 12.4% 
Occasional 
freelancer 
3.6% England 79.4% 
35-44 14.5% 
10,000-
20,000 
20.6% 
A-level/ 
vocational 
training 
30.9% 
Self-employed/ 
sole trader 
34.5% 
Northern 
Ireland 
0.3% 
45-54 30.9% 
20,000-
30,000 
17.6% BA or BSc 26.1% Partnership 8.2% Scotland 2.4% 
55-64 32.7% 
30,000-
40,000 
20.3% 
Postgraduate 
(MSc/PhD) 
18.8% 
Limited 
liability 
company 
52.7% Wales 7.9% 
65-74 14.2% 
40,000-
60,000 
13.6% Other 11.8% Other 0.9% 
  
75-84 0.9% over 60,000 14.8%     
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Table 2 
Descriptive statistics and Pearson bivariate correlations among the study variables 
 M SD 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 
1. Internalised 
motivation 
5.171 1.427 - - - - - - - - - 
2. Extrinsic 
motivation 
3.776 1.533 -.070 - - - - - - - - 
3. Self-reported 
compliance 
5.854 1.302 .309** -.068 - - - - - - - 
4. Personal moral 
norms 
6.064 1.234 .418** -.061 .784** - - - - - - 
5. Social moral 
norms 
4.262 1.436 .147** -.144** .260** .279** - - - - - 
6. Fairness 
4.649 1.379 .435** .034 .177** .289** .119* - - - - 
7. Audit belief 
5.160 1.571 .137* .282** .279** .213** .191** .218** - - - 
8. Penalty belief 
5.490 1.589 .005 .210** .238** .172** .086 .007 .292** - - 
9. Knowledge of 
tax 
4.560 1.675 .156** -.159** .243** .231** .202** .164** .064 .060 - 
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Table 3 
Regression analysis - Effects on internalised motivation  
Predictors Model 1 Model 2 
 B Standard 
Error 
β B Standard 
Error 
β 
Gender -.416 .188 -.124* -.237  .164 -.071 
Age -.083 .070 -.066 -.050  .060 -.039 
Income -.036 .050 -.041 -.015  .045 -.017 
Education .040 .031 .070 .002  .027 .003 
Personal moral norms - - - .350  .062  .303*** 
Social moral norms - - - .019  .050 .019 
Fairness - - - .343  .053 .331*** 
Audit belief - - - .007  .047 .008 
Penalty belief  - - - -.055  .046 -.061 
Knowledge of tax - - - .030  .043 .036 
R2 .029 .294 
p .046 < .001 
ДR2 - .264 
p (change) - < .001 
Notes. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
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Table 4 
Regression analysis - Effects on extrinsic motivation  
Predictors Model 1 Model 2 
 B Standard 
Error 
β B Standard 
Error 
β 
Gender .046 .203 .013 .020 .191 .005 
Age -.036 .075 -.027 -.035 .070 -.025 
Income -.105 .054 -.111 -.038 .052 -.041 
Education -.032 .033 -.053 -.001 .032 -.002 
Personal moral norms - - - -.102 .072 -.082 
Social moral norms - - - -.180 .058 -.169** 
Fairness - - - .035 .061 .031 
Audit belief - - - .276 .054 .283*** 
Penalty belief  - - - .151 .053 .156** 
Knowledge of tax - - - -.120 .050 -.131* 
R2 .016 .169 
P .264 < .001 
ДR2 - .153 
p(change) - < .001 
Notes. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
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Table 5 
Regression analysis – Internalised and extrinsic motivation as predictors of self-reported 
compliance  
Predictors Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 B Standar
d Error 
β B Standard 
Error 
β B Stand
ard 
Error 
β 
Gender -.288 .172 -.095 -.177 .166 -.058 -.189 .165 -.062 
Age -.134 .064 -.115* -.113 .061 -.098 -.122 .061 -.106* 
Income .003 .045 .004 .008 .044 .010 .006 .044 .007 
Education .026 .028 .050 .014 .027 .028 .022 .027 .043 
Internalised 
motivation  
- - - .378 .070 .290*** .372 .069 .285*** 
Extrinsic 
motivation  
- - - -.064 .069 -.049 -.048 .069 -.037 
Internalised 
motivation * 
Extrinsic 
motivation 
- - - - - - -.146 .063 -.124* 
R2 .025 .111 .126 
p .082 < .001 < .001 
ДR2 - .086 .015 
p(change) - < .001 .020     
Notes. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
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Table 6 
Conditional effect of internalised motivation on self-reported compliance at different values 
of the moderator extrinsic motivation (from PROCESS output) 
Value Percentile Effect Std. 
Error 
t-value p-value LLCI ULCI 
1.400 10th .419 .082 5.109 .000 .258 .581 
2.600 25th .339 .058 5.847 .000 .225 .453 
4.000 50th .245 .049 4.995 .000 .149 .342 
4.800 75th .192 .058 3.331 .001 .078 .305 
5.600 90th  .138 .073 1.904 .058 -.005 .281 
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Figure 1. The relationship between internalised motivation and self-reported compliance as a 
function of extrinsic motivation 
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Appendix 
 
Internalised motivation 
When I pay my taxes as required by the regulations, I do so...  
 a. ... because to me it's obvious that this is what you do.      
 b. ... to support the state and other citizens.        
 c. ... because I like to contribute to everyone's good.       
 d. ... because for me it's the natural thing to do.        
 e. ... because I regard it as my duty as citizen.       
  
 
Extrinsic motivation 
When I pay my taxes as required by the regulations, I do so... 
a. ... because a large number of tax checks are carried out.       
b. ... because the tax office often carries out checks.        
c. ... because I know that I will be audited.         
d. ... because the punishments for tax evasion are very severe.      
e. ... because I do not know exactly how to evade taxes without attracting attention.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
